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Peer-to-peer technology has made massive music piracy possible, which, in turn, has arguably 
had a significant economic impact on the recording industry. Record labels have responded to 
online piracy with litigation and are also considering self-help measures. It is currently not 
obvious whether or not these counter-piracy strategies will ultimately stifle online file sharing in 
the long term. With this paper we attempt to add to our understanding of the conflict within the 
institution that is the commercial music industry. We conduct an institutional analysis of the 
industry in transition and extend the traditional pattern modeling methodology with a formal 
resource-based model of a representative online music network. The model accounts for complex 
causal interactions between resources, private provision of common goods, free riding and 
membership dynamics. In a series of experiments that emulate anti-piracy scenarios we show that 
a peer-to-peer system may be quite resilient to outside disturbances. The experiments also 
demonstrate that policies rank differently in their effectiveness based on a selected yardstick.  
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Since they first appeared in 1999 online music-sharing networks have been very popular: 65 
million people traded music files on the Napster network within the first 20 months of its 
existence (Leuf 2002: 191). The rapid growth of these networks led many music and legal 
professionals to forewarn that, if left uncontrolled, unauthorized exchange of music may soon 
become rampant (Yu 2003). The expected loss of millions of dollars in CD sales due to online 
piracy (CNN Money 2002) will erode financial incentives to produce new material (Gallaway and 
Kinnear 2002), which may quite possibly result in the collapse of the entire music industry in five 
to ten years (BBC 2002; Mann 2003).  According to the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), which represents music copyright owners, the 9 percent decline in CD sales in 
2002 is a premonition of the future colossal losses, unless piracy is subdued (Recording Industry 
Association of America 2003).  
 
In response to pirating on a grand scale afforded by peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, the 
commercial music industry launched a fierce anti-piracy campaign comprised of litigation, 
lobbying, and self-help (Yu 2003). Often trying the boundaries of legal and regulatory systems, 
the anti-piracy war set off sharp and sagacious debates on the nature of intellectual property, the 
role of the copyright law, and fundamental notions of citizenry, such as, freedom of speech 
(Lessig 2001; Goldstein 2003; Harmon and Schwartz 2003; Green 2003). Since institutions 
invariably affect the economy (North 1992), the outcomes of the polemics in courts will have 
considerable pecuniary consequences for the recording industry and the entire economy. New 
laws and new interpretations of old laws may cause new industries that are attempting to grow on 
the platform of peer-to-peer technology flourish or decline (for examples see Non 2000 and Elkin 
2002).  
 
It is still not clear if the anti-piracy campaign will work (France and Grover 2003). Some analysts 
predict that peer-to-peer networks will ebb under pressure, while other experts prophesize a 
continuous raise in popularity (BBC 2002). With this article we hope to add to the understanding 
of the institutional conflict within the commercial music industry.  The framework for our 
analysis is rooted in the descriptive pattern modeling approach of institutional economics (Wilber 
and Harrison 1978).  However, acting on a proposition that the traditionally narrative analysis of 
institutional economics may be buttressed by formal methods (North 1992; Hodgson 1998), we 
use the approach of institutional dynamics (Radzicki 1988; Radzicki 1990a; Radzicki and Seville 
1993) to build a resource-based model of a peer-to-peer community. Then in a series of computer 
experiments with the model we simulate counter-piracy actions by copyright holders; the 11
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experiments reveal that the internal feedback structure of a peer-to-peer system renders it 
extremely resilient to outside disturbances. Experiments also suggest that anti-piracy measures 
are likely to differ in their effectiveness.  
 
We proceed by describing the institution of commercial music industry. Then we explain actions 
that copyright owners have tried or may undertake against online piracy. Subsequently, we 
develop a formal model of a representative peer-to-peer network that is then tested against a 
reference year. We devote one section to a series of experiments that examine the consequences 
of three anti-piracy policies inspired by litigation and self-help approaches. We offer a brief 
summary of findings and conclusions in the last section.  
The institution of Commercial Music Industry 
An institution is operationally characterized by the presence of: (i) participants; (ii) rules that 
govern activities within the institution; and (iii) folk views that explain and justify actions within 
the institution (Neale 1987).  Rules and folk views are constraints that define an institution and 
they may be formal, such as the copyright law, common law, government regulations, and 
informal, such as, conventions, and socially accepted or self imposed norms of behavior (North 
1992). The commercial music industry has all the characteristics of an institution, as we describe 
in this section.  
Participants 
Participants of the commercial music industry are legion and, among others, include: artists, 
recording studios, agents, customers, trade publications, disk jockeys and many more (Dolfsma 
2002; France and Grover 2003). Since an organization is a particular form of an institution 
created for a purposeful coordination of activities (Hodgson 1998: 180), some of these players are 
institutions in their own right. New participants emerge and old ones wane away as the 
importance of players changes over time. Dolfsma (2002) offers an account of an institutional 
transformation that led to the disappearance of a music “presenter” and its replacement by a “disk 
jockey.” Players also merge, as the recording industry undergoes consolidations. Unlike in the 
early days when there were no national music conglomerates (Gallaway and Kinnear 2001), the 
industry is currently dominated by five major international corporations, commonly referred to as 
The Big Five; they are: Vivendi’s Universal Music Group, AOL Time Warner’s Warner Music 
Group, Sony Music Entertainment, Bertelsman’s BMG, and EMI Group. On a recent account 
these companies controlled 75 percent of world-wide music sales (Mathews 2003).  11
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Players may appear and gain prominence due to novel technologies. For example, the 
introduction of the point-of-sale retail information systems in the 1980s led to the invention of a 
new music popularity chart. Adoption of the chart in 1991 by the leading trade publication 
Billboard transformed the industry by boosting positions of a small number of record companies, 
allowing greater segmentation of the music market, giving prominence to country music, and 
negatively impacting albums from some independent labels (Anand and Peterson 2000). 
Similarly, music-sharing communities owe their existence to the novel peer-to-peer technology. 
Rules 
Observing that institutions do not exist in isolation (Neale 1987), institutional economists have 
long recognized the inseparable amalgamation of legal and economic activity in the market world 
(e.g. Medema 1992); the alliance has been dubbed a legal-economic nexus (Samuels 1989). Soon 
after its formation in the 1880s, the music industry secured the extension of the copyright law to 
music (Anand and Peterson 2000). By constituting what is property and establishing ownership 
rights, the legal system since then defined the structure of the music industry (Samuels 1989; 
Coase 1992: 717) and protected copyright owners against piracy (Lister 1998).  
Folk views 
People use folk views to “justify the activities or explain why they are going on, how they are 
related, what is thought important and what unimportant in the patterns of regularity” (Neale 
1987). The wide adoption of music-swapping technology showed that the public at large does not 
see music sharing as a criminal act, even though the recording industry believes that using peer-
to-peer networks is akin to stealing (Harmon and Schwartz 2003). This perception of legitimacy 
of music-sharing comes from the underlying socio-cultural values of a society (Dolfsma 2002) – a 
great number of the Internet users perceive online music as a free public good. The origins of this 
view may come from two facts: (i) music has been available as a free public good for years 
through the radio media (Gallaway and Kinnear 2001; Harmon and Schwartz 2003); and (ii) 
content on the Internet for the most part is free (Gallaway and Kinnear 2001). Moreover, 
“institutions constitute the arenas in which people try to accomplish their aims” (Neale 1987). 
Thus when faced with a choice of distribution channels they choose the least costly and most 
convenient one. As Gallaway and Kinnear (2002) succinctly put it, talking about P2P networks: 
“In the commercial milieu, one does not expect rational individuals to reject the option which 
offers lower prices, lower transactions costs, and better variety.”   
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Attitudes toward the new technology among artists are less uniform. Many of them disapprove of 
the peer-to-peer music distribution (The Economist 2003; Roberts 2003). Besides the pure 
revenue considerations, a strong incentive for artists to resist P2P is that it undercuts the current 
sales-based performance charts (Nelson 2003), which are the most important signaling tool in the 
industry (Anand and Peterson 2000). However, many “non-marketable” artists welcomed the P2P 
revolution because it gives them visibility and allows them to reach a wider audience (Gallaway 
and Kinnear 2001).  
Interaction between incumbent structures and file-sharing networks 
Institutions exhibit inertia in terms of habit, persistence, and institutional lock-in (Hodgson 1998). 
SoundScan, Inc. waited five years before its new music popularity chart was adopted by 
Billboard in 1991 (Anand and Peterson 2000). Following the same behavioral trend, the 
constituent members of the RIAA do not welcome changes brought by the peer-to-peer 
technology. In an attempt to control the development and adoption of the technology the RIAA 
have applied litigation and considered using potent self-help measures against file-swappers (Yu 
2003). We review these anti-piracy tactics below.  
Litigation 
The first sortie launched by the copyright owners against the new file-sharing movement 
concerned the future of Napster, Inc. After lengthy proceedings and many expert witness 
testimonies by prominent economists and legal scholars on the merits and downfalls of the novel 
technology, a federal judge in California ruled that Napster was a contributory and vicarious 
copyright violator (Hilden 2002; The Wall Street Journal 2001). Unable to comply with all the 
requirements imposed by the court, Napster shut down its servers in July 2001, two years after the 
service started in 1999. Combating peer-to-peer technology, however, proved to be not unlike 
fighting the mythical Greek serpent Hydra who, for every cut off head, grew two new heads in its 
place. Napster was succeeded by dozens of imitators that are more resilient to attempts to shut 
them down for a number of reasons (Yu 2003; Woody 2003). Firstly, while Napster utilized a 
central database of all shared files, the new networks do not have central servers. Secondly, some 
software companies resorted to legal and ownership maneuvering that made it difficult to track 
and prosecute them. A prominent example of the latter defense strategy has been Sharman 
Networks, Inc., which distributes software for the popular KaZaA network (see e.g. Yu 2003; 
Woody 2003; CNN 2003). Thirdly, U.S. courts do not seem to be willing to hold distributed 
networks responsible for copyright violations, which is a dramatic departure from the Napster 11
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ruling. In April 2003, a U.S. District Court ruled in favor of Grokster Ltd. and StreamCast 
Networks Inc. – two companies involved in the development of file sharing software – citing that 
the companies do not control the traded material (Mathews and Wingfield 2003; CNN 2003).  
 
After the April 2003 setback, the RIAA and its movie industry counterpart, the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA), revised their anti-piracy tactics by announcing that they would 
go after individual users. The RIAA threatened with hundreds of lawsuits against sharers 
(Holloway 2003). To prepare the battle ground, copyright owners sued and won a case against 
Verizon, in which a federal judge ordered the telecommunications company to reveal the names 
of its two Internet subscribers who shared copyrighted material (The Economist 2003). Until that 
ruling P2P participants were protected by the right to anonymity (Yen 2001).  At the time of this 
article, a few hundred cases against peer-to-peer network users have been filed and are still 
pending in American courts (Semple 2003). 
Self-help 
Another line of offense considered by copyright owners is self-help. After a federal judge ruled in 
favor of StreamCast Networks Inc. and Grokster, the RIAA began spamming KaZaA and 
Grokster hosts with instant messages warning of legal penalties (Mathews 2003). Madonna 
posted bogus music files to P2P networks posed as songs from her new album; they contained 
nothing but profanity (The Economist 2003).  Record companies have also been known to post 
song files with random sounds inserted in them, such as, for example, the Gettysburg Address and 
car horns – all aimed at frustrating the pirates (Roberts 2003).  
 
More potent self-help weapons against peer-to-peer networks will be available if the effort to pass 
the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act succeeds in Congress. This piece of legislation is an 
example of future-binding encapsulation, that is, the legitimization of new innovations that will 
perpetuate the ceremonially warranted power structure (Bush 1987: 1094). U.S. Representative 
Howard L. Berman, who sponsors the bill, explains that the new law would protect record labels 
from liability if they resort to using “limited self-help measures” (Berman 2003). The Berman bill 
would legalize actions that are currently prohibited under various federal and state laws (Hilden 
2002). It may override, for example, the Massachusetts Computer Crime Law enacted in 1995 
that makes unauthorized access into a computer system illegal. All large record labels are 
readying for the self-help phase of copyright warfare by investing in companies that develop 11
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programs for attacking the computers of music pirates.  The programs will either freeze offending 
computers or redirect peer network users to legitimate sites for music purchase (Russell 2003). 
Model Development 
Actions by copyright owners affect peer-to-peer networks in ways that are complex and 
multidimensional in nature. In this section we develop a computer model of a music-sharing 
network that will help us to understand system responses to anti-piracy measures. After reviewing 
the workings of a typical peer-to-peer network we proceed to define the boundary and overall 
structure of the model. The model is implemented using the computer tools of system dynamics. 
Before we describe individual sectors of the model, we offer a brief introduction to system 
dynamics.  
A representative peer-to-peer network 
The peer grid of a system such as Gnutella or KaZaA is a virtual network formed at the 
application level that is distinct from the underlying physical network (Ripeanu, Foster et al. 
2002). A person can participate in a peer network by either downloading a piece of software 
commonly referred to as a “servent” or by logging to a dedicated web site (Bolcer 2000). A 
Gnutella node forwards the search query to other nodes that it is connected to until the message 
travels the maximum allowed number of hops determined by the Time To Live (TTL) parameter. 
Hosts that contain the material in the query, respond with a message that is traversed along the 
path it arrived. The original Gnutella protocol treated all nodes equally, irrespective of their 
network connection speed, memory, or clock speed (Bolcer 2000); currently, more advanced 
algorithms for peer communities are being developed (e.g., Lv, Cao et al. 2002). 
 
Peer-to-peer systems have been compared to an Internet potluck: nodes contribute to the network 
by offering files and by routing network traffic (Kan 2001).  Users, however, clearly have 
incentives to free ride with respect to content and bandwidth, which means “taking their share of 
it and keeping their own resources for themselves”  (Marwell and Ames 1979). Providing content 
to other peers is costly not only because acquiring the content may impose fixed costs on the 
altruistic peer in terms of purchasing a CD, but also because each additional upload slows down 
the serving computer and its own downloads (Adar and Huberman 2000; Yang and Garcia-
Molina 2002). Peers may also choose not to stay connected to the network for long periods in 
order to avoid the exposure to computer worms and hacker attacks (Rincon 2002).  
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Free riding may be accomplished in a variety of ways. By default most of the peer-to-peer 
software shares all downloaded files (Golle et al. (2001); http://www.limewhier.com). However, 
Adar and Huberman (2000) found by analyzing P2P traffic data that only about 30% of users 
shared files on Gnutella and 20 percent of hosts shared 98 percent of all the files available on the 
network. A number of other studies confirmed the existence of significant free riding tendencies 
on music networks. Figure 1a shows file-sharing statistics that typify the situation. Providing 
undesirable content is also a form of freeloading (Adar and Huberman 2000). Adar and 
Huberman reported that 1 percent of hosts provided 47% of answers to file requests and 25% 
provided 98% of the responses. Bandwidth and processing capacity offered to the network can be 
controlled through the number of allowed connections and by misstating the connection speed.  
Extreme cases of free riding are browser-based search web sites, for example, asiayeah.com and 
gnute.com, that allow users to enter a peer network and search the shared database without 
contributing any content or routing the network data traffic.  
 
A person may also shirk by simply turning the computer off. There is a special term used in the 
peer-to-peer community to describe this type of behavior – fishing – a user logs into the network, 
downloads what he needs, and promptly leaves the system.  Withdrawal of a host results in lost 
queries and failed uploads. Data presented in Figure 1b show that about half of the connections 
are 60 minutes or shorter and only 20% of hosts remain continuously in the network for longer 
than 3 hours.  
 
        
 




Figure 1: Resource sharing in peer networks: (a) a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the 
number of files shared on Gnutella; (b) session duration on Napster and Gnutella. Source: Saroiu et al. 
(July 2001) 11




It has been suggested (Adar and Huberman 2000) that rampant free riding can be the reason 
behind variations in network performance, which may be measured in terms of search response 
latency and the probability of successful downloads – as more users join the network without 
adequately contributing to the common pool, public resources of a file-trading network become 
depleted leading to poor performance. Economic literature on the private provision of public 
goods suggests that typically the free riding problem worsens with the group size (see, for 
example, Isaac and Walker 1988 and Gaube 2001).  Group size has been also found to be 
important for online communities, just like for physical groups (Butler 2001). Statistical analysis 
of P2P network traffic by Asvanund, et al. (2002) confirmed the declining marginal value, and 
increasing marginal cost, of each additional peer. 
Model structure 
We model a representative network, while holding influences from copyright owners external to 
the model. The model boundary and its structure are shown in Figure 2 within the grayed area. 
The Recording Industry represents a collection of copyright owners, artists, record labels, the 
RIAA, and lawyers. The two arrows entering the Representative P2P Network symbolically show 
litigation and self-help efforts by the Recording Industry. Notice that the commercial impact of 
the peer network on the traditional recording industry is not part of this analysis and thus there are 
no connections from the Network to the Recording Industry.  
 
The model has been implemented numerically using the integral equation methodology of system 
dynamics. Radzicki (Radzicki 1988; Radzicki 1990b) examined the many similarities between the 
approach of institutional economics and the computer modeling approach of system dynamics 
and proposed a formal institutional dynamics synthesis between the two disciplines. Resembling 
the analysis of institutional economics, system dynamics analysis is interdisciplinary, begins with 
a review of various facts pertinent to the case, uses extensively historic information about 
institutions, and is not tied to the idea of homoeconomicus, but rather recognizes the bounded 
nature of human decisions. The only essential difference between the methods is that a system 
dynamics analysis concludes with a formal computer model. In this journal, Radzicki and Seville 
(Radzicki and Seville 1993) have successfully used numerical simulations to support their 
institutional analysis of a township in Massachusetts; Saeed (Saeed 2003) applied the 
methodology of system dynamics to the analysis of institution building for the case of mitigation 
banking. An authoritative primer on system dynamics is an encyclopedic book by Sterman 11
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(Sterman 2000); the reader may also consult Warren (2002), which contains a collection of 
models designed for resource-based analysis of various economic and business cases. 
 
 
Figure 2: Model structure 
 
Sectors 
In this section we review the four sectors that comprise the model representation of a peer 
network; they are: Network users, Content, Bandwidth, and Traffic and network performance. 
Complete computer code and model documentation are available from the authors upon request. 
Membership sector 
The membership sector, as shown in Figure 3, captures the daily average number of peers logged 
into the system. We assume some normal adoption and attrition rates; then, if the system is useful 
for current users and attractive in the view of potential users, the network use will increase. Word 
of mouth and media exposure are two typical mechanisms that stimulate such a growth. Since the 
introduction of Napster, the technology has drawn a lot of attention from the media, which 
contributes to the formation of public perception of the network’s usefulness. Changes in the peer 
network attractiveness modify the typical growth rates of the system: lower attractiveness 
increases churn and leads to the reduction in the new user arrival rate; greater attractiveness has 
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the opposite effect. Normally users respond with some delay to changes in the network’s 
performance. Since media, including on-line news groups, is quick to report and discuss any 
performance glitches of a popular network, the shortest delay among the three delays in the model 
is the opinion formation delay for the media. The value of network attractiveness is determined 
by the content attractiveness (which in turn depends on available content), latency of responses to 
requests, and the average probability of completing a successful download.  There are first-hand 
and second-hand reputation effects (Warren 2003): new customers join based on second-hand 
reputation information and customers leave based on their first-hand information. The variable 
free riding multiplier moderates the effect of network size on the magnitude of the free loading 
problem. The contribution fraction measures the average share of individual content and 
bandwidth that is being made available by each peer to the rest of the network; the share is equal 
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Shared content sector 
Figure 4 presents a rendition of the shared content sector. This sector keeps track of the number 
of files available through the network. The maximum content a new peer can bring to the group is 
the number of music files on his hard drive, which we code as maximum new user contribution. It 
is achieved when contribution fraction is equal to one; otherwise, the average user contribution is 
a fraction of the maximum user contribution. We use a coflow formulation (Sterman 2000) to 
determine the increase in the common pool of files: added content is proportional to the new on-
line users, which is defined in the Membership sector. We assume that the possibility that a node 
drops out of a network does not depend on its level of altruism. Thus, withdrawn content is 
proportional to the attrition and average shared content.  
 
 
A common feature of peer networks is that due to the limited connectivity and the finite time to 
live (TTL) parameter, the potential reach of each node is significantly smaller than the entire 
network (Leuf 2002: 199). For data collected for a seven month period starting in November 
2000, Ripeanu, Foster et al. (2002) found that the average number of hosts visible to a node is 
independent of the network size. Ritter (Ritter 2001) estimates that for a network in which each 
node has on average 3 edges and TTL is set to 7 (a typical number in Gnutella), at best 381 nodes 
are visible from each peer. The variable content reachable by a user captures this fact. The 
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relative richness of the network is the ratio of the reachable content to the typical collection of a 
user who does not participate in the music exchange.  In the current version of the model, we 
assume that there is some average collection of music owned by a typical user; the relative 
richness of the network, which is inversely proportional to the typical collection, determines 
content attractiveness through a diminishing returns schedule. 
Capacity sector 
The Capacity sector is shown in Figure 5. Similarly to the shared content the network capacity, 
measured in terms of the shared bandwidth, increases with each additional new peer and 
diminishes when peers leave the network. At best, each peer contributes its entire available 
bandwidth, which is the typical node bandwidth. However, in most situations the contribution is 




Figure 5: Capacity sector 
Traffic sector 
Sector shown in Figure 6 models traffic in the network. Following Ritter (Ritter 2001) we assume 
a linear relationship between the number of queries and the size of a peer network, that is, peers 
submit some average number of requests per node to the system. Additionally, we assume, 
following Yang and Garcia-Molina (2002), that some average aggregate bandwidth (in bytes) is 
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summed as the average traffic per download. The variable traffic is an aggregate measure for the 
entire file-sharing network.  
 
Figure 6: Traffic and network performance sector 
 
 
Utilization is the ratio of traffic to the connection capacity. In general, once a node’s bandwidth is 
saturated a number of things may happen (Leuf 2002: 121). Firstly, a connection might be 
dropped. This would lead to lost return paths, unfulfilled requests and repeat of request 
broadcasts. Secondly, the node may simply ignore some of the request traffic. Thirdly, the node 
can buffer some messages and wait till bandwidth frees up, but this would slow down computer 
performance and also contribute to the latency along the path. Network theory suggests that delay 
(latency) and network traffic for a given capacity are related as shown in Figure 7.  This 
relationship is included as a delay factor.  In a busy network, relative latency will increase beyond 
the benchmark value of normal latency. Consumers expect short response times to their searches. 
It has been suggested (e.g. Leuf 2002: 130) that Napster was able to achieve explosive popularity 
in its heyday because it provided quick responses to queries for music files. We represent the 
consumer reaction to delays with the latency acceptance variable. Latency acceptance is declining 
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Figure 7: Average packet delay as a function of traffic load.  
Source: Pecar and Garbin 2000: 429. 
 
Users tend to resubmit song queries if the reply has not arrived within some short time interval. 
Users will also resubmit a query if the download is interrupted. Additionally, the peer software 
itself will resend query packets if it does not receive confirmations of its messages from other 
nodes. This forms a reinforcing loop: more traffic slows down the system, which, in turn, 
gradually stimulates more traffic. The loop is balanced by the decline in traffic as users 
disconnect from the network because of the poor mesh performance.  
 
Decision Support System 
We developed a “flight simulator” that is based on the system dynamics computer model
1. 
Decision support systems (DSS or a “flight simulator”) facilitate semistructured and unstructured 
decision making [Laudon and Laudon 1998: 591], which is characterized by the lack of 
knowledge of how to search for an acceptable solution due to the unclear nature of the problem 
and its structure [Eom 2000]. The P2P piracy problem demonstrates all the features of an 
unstructured problem. The problem is relatively new and no working solutions are known. 
Additionally, the complexity of the technical, legal, and economic issues makes the problem 
obscure. Many experts of varying backgrounds may need to be involved in finding an adequate 
solution, thus a user-friendly interface is highly desirable. The simulator permits anyone with 
basic knowledge of the Windows environment to conduct computer experiments in order to gain 
                                                      
1 We used the simulation software package Vensim DSS. 11
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a better understanding of the behavior of a P2P network under various business and regulatory 
scenarios. Figure 8 shows one of the screens of the DSS. We used the DSS to conduct numerical 
experiments that are presented below. 
Figure 8: User interface of the P2P decision support system 
 
Base case simulation 
Figure 8 shows a fairly good fit between some data on the actual number of connected hosts in a 
peer-to-peer network over the course of a year and the simulated time series generated by our 
model. The pattern exhibited in the figure is an outcome of a complex interaction between the 
private provision of public resources (bandwidth and content), private demand for music 
exchange, and the performance properties of a computer network. One immediately notices the 
absence of high frequency fluctuations in the synthetic data. The fast oscillations in the actual 
data are due to the hourly variations in online usage – more people are on the Internet around 
midnight than at 6 o’clock in the morning (Kitz and Essien 2002). We do not replicate hourly 
variations in order to avoid the potential problem of stiffness that arises when time constants of 11
th International Conference – Computing in Economics and Finance. Washington, DC. June 23 - 25, 2005 
 17 
significantly different magnitudes are employed in a model (see, for example, Maron and Lopez 
(1991) for discussion). 
 
 
Figure 8: Simulated trajectory (smooth curve) and actual data (jiggered time series). 
Actual data are the number of Gnutella network hosts during one year between 




The graph in Figure 10 is a causal loop diagram (Radzicki 1988) of a peer-to-peer system; it 
consists of all important state and flow variables and cause-and-effect links between them. As the 
initial small group of network users grows, so does the amount of shared content (the User 
Contributed Content Loop R1 in Figure 10) and so does the bandwidth available to the network 
traffic (the User Contributed Bandwidth Loop R2). The network’s popularity is further enhanced 
by the media attention (the Publicity Loop R5) and through the word of mouth (the Word of 
Mouth Loop R4).  
 
The growth in network resources is clearly visible in the data from the base simulation (Figure 
11a). The free riding tendencies, however, become more prominent as the system scales up (the 
Content Free Riding Loop B3 and the Bandwidth Free Riding Loop B2). This leads to the gradual 
decline in the average membership contributions of content and bandwidth. Additionally, a larger 
network generates more traffic (the Traffic Growth Loop B1). The exacerbating inadequacy of 
resources increases the network’s search response latency and lowers the probability of a 
successful download (Figure 11b). Increase in latency will induce some hosts to resubmit their 
requests (the Overload Escalation Loop R3). A decline in network performance contributes to the 
growing overall dissatisfaction with the network, leading to a fall in the network usage starting 
 11
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around day 176 of the simulation (Figure 11). This, however, reduces the traffic and network 
performance begins to improve (Figure 11b and the Traffic Growth Loop B1).  
 
 
Anti-piracy policy experiments 
Copyright owners may obstruct the file-sharing activity within peer-to-peer networks by a 
number of means. In this section we review three anti-piracy policy alternatives: (i) using either 
litigation or self-help copyright owners target large-scale contributors to the network, which are 
not necessarily its heavy users; (ii) corporations attempt to limit file swapping by eliminating the 
most grievous copyright violators, that is, those users who download significant amounts of files, 
by either suing them or by disabling such nodes online; and (iii) recording companies opt to 
disrupt the infrastructure performance by generating bogus traffic that clogs the system, which is 
a variant of a self-help approach. We investigate how the system responds to these policies and 







































































Figure 10: Causal structure of a peer-to-peer network 11








Figure 11: Simulated network dynamics 11
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Policy 1: Targeting large-scale contributors 
Since the early stages of the battle against music piracy, the RIAA has been threatening to 
prosecute the offenders. On September 8 of 2003, it made good on the promise by filing suites 
against users in the United States who contributed significant music libraries to the network 
(Semple 2003). Information on file-sharers was collected using automated Net crawlers (France 
and Grover 2003). The move prompted many users to scale back on their generous file offerings 
(Harmon and Schwartz 2003; The Associated Press 2004). Because only a very small percent of 
users contribute most of the shared  
files, the expectation is that such a reduction may negatively affect the common pool of free 
songs. However, there were still reports that the system continued to function and exchanges were 
still occurring. We would like to understand how the system responds to such an anti-piracy 
measure. 
 
In highly uncertain situations people rely on rules of thumb (Hodgson 1998). After observing the 
trials, users may develop a rule of thumb similar to the following: “to avoid prosecution share 
only a limited amount of files.” We simulate such a decline in maximum contributions by 
lowering the maximum new user contribution in the Content sector, Figure 4, by 30 percent, from 
3000 to 2000 files. We begin our simulations in a steady state in order to eliminate the transient 
adjustment effects and concentrate on the system’s response to the policy. The policy has an 
immediate impact on shared Content (Figure 12): users connecting to the network no longer bring 
the same amount of content as before, thus sharply reducing the inflow to the stock of content 
(Figure 4). This is followed by a quick decline in the stock of shared content, which, in turn, 
reduces the attractiveness of the network and leads to the erosion of the user base (the Shared 
Content Loop R1 in Figure 10, exacerbated by the reinforcing effects due to the Word of Mouth 
Loop R4 and the Publicity Loop R5). Smaller network size, however, eases the free riding 
problem (the Content Free Riding Loop B3 and the Bandwidth Free Riding Loop B2). Improved 
average user contributions slow down the erosion of network resources (Shared Content in Figure 
12), which, with some delay, encourages new growth in online membership (Network Users in 
Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: Shared content decline due to Policy 1 implemented at time 60 
 
 
Policy 2: Targeting active downloaders 
The best way to change a complex system in a desired direction is to align goals of its participants 
(Radzicki 1988: 649). Accordingly, the ultimate goal of the lawsuits against online music-sharers 
is to change the behavior of the online community (France and Grover 2003; Harmon and 
Schwartz 2003). In this experiment we test a situation in which people respond to the RIAA suing 
heavy music network users by adjusting their downloading habits – they download fewer songs, 
which is a realistic response (Harmon and Schwartz 2003). Thus, for this experiment, we lower 
the typical download request per user in the Traffic Sector (Figure 6) to about one half of the 
original frequency: from 1.87 to .9 song requests per person per day (Figure 13). The immediate 
consequence is a reduction in network traffic. But lighter traffic results in better performance (the 
Traffic Growth Loop B1 and the Overload Escalation Loop R3 in Figure 10), that is, shorter 
latency and greater probability of a successful download (Figure 13). This attracts a greater 
number of occasional users – that is the network users trajectory in Figure 13 is upward sloping 
immediately after the policy is implemented at time 60. Interestingly, a rise in users shortly after 
lawsuits began has been observed in selected music networks (Harmon and Schwartz 2003). The 
growth in the number of nodes gradually degrades network performance and attractiveness, 
which overturns the membership growth pattern (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Network response to Policy 2 implemented at time 60 
 
 
Policy 3: Targeting infrastructure 
Litigation of individual online network members is expensive and impractical (Yu 2003). The 
majority of individual pirates are not attractive legal targets because they are not rich enough to 
pay monetary judgments (Yen 2001). The RIAA may hope to recover only between $2000 and 
$15000 per each settled case (Aftab 2003). Therefore, music companies have strong incentives to 
search for more cost-effective methods to fight pirates.  For example, they may choose to 
introduce automated bogus peer-to-peer nodes that act as ultimate free riders (not unlike the 
existing network sites asiayeah.com and gnute.com). By generating numerous requests and not 
contributing any content or processing traffic from other peers, such nodes clog the peer network 
bandwidth, increase latency, and lower the probability of successful downloads for network users. 
If sufficient traffic is generated, then the system may collapse completely. In effect, such an 
intrusion is equivalent to artificially increasing the average number of file requests per each real 
connected user. 
 
To simulate this situation, we increase typical download requests per user in the Traffic Sector 
(Figure 6). Its value is changed from 1.87 to 3 per user per day, which is about a 60 percent hike. 
As expected, traffic increases (Figure 14) leading to a surge in latency and a drop in the 
probability of successful downloads. Accordingly, fewer users join and stay online – network 
users trajectory falls. But this leads to less traffic (the Traffic Growth Loop B1 in Figure 10), 11
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Based on their background, participants who are involved in policy implementation may want to 
use different criteria to gage policy effectiveness. From the legal and regulatory standpoints the 
best anti-piracy strategy may be the one that allows the least number of violators. On the other 
hand, a recording industry executive is likely to have pecuniary objectives, and thus, she may 
prefer a strategy that is best at restoring music sales.  Because of this discrepancy, we compare 
the effectiveness of anti-piracy policies along two dimensions: the number of network users and 
exchanged content volume.  
Measure: number of network users 
A network’s response to the three policies with respect to the number of daily users is pictured in 
Figure 15. Each simulation was run for the time sufficient for the transient behavior of the system 
to settle. Table 1 summarizes the simulation statistics. Policy 2 is the least effective among the 
three policies because it allows the greatest average number of users (Table 1) and in the long run 
the network use upticks beyond the pre-policy level. Though our implementations of Policy 1 and 
Policy 3 are nearly equally effective in the long run -- they reach about the same steady state 
membership numbers (Figure 15) – the attack on infrastructure, Policy 3, results in a highly 11
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unstable transient trajectory. Additionally, Policy 3 is more effective on average at discouraging 
network use (Table 1). Hence, in the long run, either Policy 1 or Policy 3 may be preferred to 




Figure 15: Policies compared with respect to the number of online nodes 
 
Measure: exchanged content volume 
Figure 16 presents daily figures for traded content while summary statistics are presented in Table 
1. The response to Policy 3 was, again, the most volatile; it also led to the highest average and 
steady state volumes of traded content. Policy 1 is better than Policy 3 at suppressing file 
swapping in the long run as well as on average (see Table 1). Interestingly, in the long run, Policy 
3 induces greater network use in terms of file swapping than before the introduction of the policy.  
Policy 2 achieved the lowest long run and average traded content volume.  Thus, if one cares 
about the impact music piracy has on sales then she may choose Policy 2, that is, a policy against 
active downloaders.  
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Figure 16: Policies compared with respect to the traded content 
 
 
Table 1: Policy response summary statistics 
  Measure 1: Online nodes  Measure 2: Traded content 
  Max  Min  Average  St. deviation  Max  Min  Average  St. deviation 
Policy 1  14,374  9,799  11,236  896  24,169  17,519  19,873  1,259 
Policy 2  19,861  14,374  17,197  927  24,169  12,751  15,482  1,673 




Peer-to-peer technology has transformed music into a widely available and easily copied public 
good by allowing consumers to obtain music without paying royalties to copyright owners. In this 
article we have considered several actions that have been either implemented or reviewed by the 
recording industry as counter-piracy measures. Starting with an institutional description of the 
commercial music industry, we amended the traditional methodology with a formal computer 
model. To build the model, we carefully reviewed a representative online music community, 
including technological and behavioral characteristics of such a system. A base run confirmed 
model’s ability to reproduce the behavior of the reference network.  
 
After a satisfactory model was built, three policy experiments were performed. Policy 1 simulated 
a strategy that targets large-scale file-sharers. Policy 2 and Policy 3 were based on attempts to 11
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control downloading and network performance respectively. Each of the strategies has a real-life 
counterpart. One of the most striking observations from the experiments was that some of the 
measures led not only to temporal, but also to the long-term increase in network use. Such effects 
were created by the complex feedback nature of the popular networks, making the nets extremely 
resilient to any attempts to disrupt them. Network robustness suggests that the RIAA is not 
assured of gaining an upper hand in this copyright battle. A review of two measurements logged 
during the computer runs displayed a discrepancy in policy ordering based on the counter-piracy 
effectiveness: a policy using automated nodes that slowed down the system (Policy 3) was the 
most potent in terms of the decline in the number of connected nodes, but it lost to a policy that 
targeted heavy downloaders (Policy 2) when compared by traded content. This suggests the 
importance of selecting an adequate yardstick when discussing policy alternatives and their 




Adar, E. and B. A. Huberman. "Free Riding on Gnutella." First Monday 5, 10 (2000). 
 
Aftab, P. "Other Voices: The Magical World of Music Online." Information Week, September 29 
(2003). 
 
Anand, N. and R. A. Peterson. "When Market Information Constitutes Fields: Sensemaking of 
Markets in the Commercial Music Industry." Organization Science 11, 3 (2000): 270-284. 
 
Asvanund, A., K. Clay, R. Krishnan and M. Smith. "Bigger May Not Be Better: An Empirical 
Analysis of Optimal Membership Rules in Peer-to-Peer Networks." Information Networking 
Symposium 2002, Pittsburgh, PA, May 15, 2002, (2002). 
 
BBC. "Music Swapping on the Net Rising." Available at 
Http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2309671.stm, October 9 (2002). 
 
Berman, H. L. "The Truth About the Peer to Peer Privacy Prevention Act." Modern Practice 
(available at http://practice.findlaw.com ), May (2003). 
 
Bolcer, G. A. "Bandwidth Barriers to Gnutella Network Scalability." FoRKed (available at 
http://xent.com/FoRK-archive/sept00/0657.html), September 22 (2000). 
 
Bush, P. D. "The Theory of Institutional Change." Journal of Economic Issues 21, 3 (1987): 
1075-1116. 
 
Butler, B. S. "Membership Size, Communication Activity, and Sustainability: A Resource-Based 
Model of Online Social Structures." Information Systems Research 12, 4 (2001): 346-362. 
 11
th International Conference – Computing in Economics and Finance. Washington, DC. June 23 - 25, 2005 
 27 
CNN. "Song-Swapping War Rages On." http://money.cnn.com, April 28 (2003). 
 
CNN Money. "Napster Sold to Roxio for $5.3 Million." CNN (available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/11/27/news/deals/napster/index.htm), (2002). 
 
Coase, R. H. "The Institutional Structure of Production." The American Economic Review 82, 4 
(1992): 713-719. 
 
Dolfsma, W. "Mediated Preferences -- How Institutions Affect Consumption." Journal of 
Economic Issues 36, 2 (2002): 449-457. 
 
Elkin, N. "The Future of the P2P Transaction Market." Entrepreneur.com, January 2 (2002). 
 
Eom, S. B. "The Contributions of Systems Science to the Development of the Decision Support 
System Subspecialties: An Empirical Investigation." Systems Research and Behavioral Science 
17, 2 (2000): 117-134. 
 
France, M. and R. Grover. "Striking Back." Business Week, September 29 (2003). 
 
Gallaway, T. and D. Kinnear. "Unchained Melody: A Price Discrimination-Based Policy 
Proposal for Addressing the Mp3 Revolution." Journal of Economic Issues 35, 2 (2001): 279-
287. 
 
Gallaway, T. and D. Kinnear. "Free Ride: An Institutionalist Analysis of Information in the 
Internet Age." Journal of Economic Issues 36, 2 (2002): 441-448. 
 
Gaube, T. "Group Size and Free Riding When Private and Public Goods Are Gross Substitutes." 
Economics Letters 70, 1 (2001): 127-132. 
 
Goldstein, P. Copyright's Highway. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
Golle, P., K. Leyton-Brown, I. Mironov and M. Lillibridge. Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-
Peer Networks. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, 2001 , Tampa, 
Florida, USA, ACM Press, New York, 2001. 
 
Green, H. "The Underground Internet." Business Week, September 15 (2003): 80-82. 
 
Harmon, A. and J. Schwartz. "Music File Sharers Keep Sharing." The New York Times, 
September 19 (2003). 
 
Hilden, J. "Going after Individuals for Copyright Violations: The New Bill That Would Grant 
Copyright Owners a "License to Hack" Peer-to-Peer Networks." FindLaw.com, August 20 
(2002). 
 
Hodgson, G. M. "The Approach of Institutional Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 36, 
1 (1998): 166-192. 
 
Holloway, L. "Recording Industry to Sue Internet Music Swappers." The New York Times, June 
26 (2003). 
 11
th International Conference – Computing in Economics and Finance. Washington, DC. June 23 - 25, 2005 
 28 
Isaac, R. M. and J. M. Walker. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary 
Contributions Mechanism." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, (1988): 180-199. 
 
Kan, G. Gnutella. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive Technology. A. Oram. 
Cambridge, O'Reilly, 2001. 
 
Kitz, D. and K. Essien. "Analysis of a Campus-Wide Wireless Network." MOBICOM '02, 
September 23-28, 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, (2002). 
 
Laudon, K. C. and J. P. Laudon. Management Information Systems: New Approaches to 
Organization and Technology. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1998. 
 
Lessig, L. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. New York, 
Random House, 2001. 
 
Leuf, B. Peer to Peer: Collaboration and Sharing over the Internet. Boston, MA, Addison-
Wesley, 2002. 
 
Lister, T. "World Music Industry Cracking Down on Pirates." CNN.com (available at 
http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/Music/9807/27/music.piracy/index.html), July 27 (1998). 
 
Lv, Q., P. Cao, E. Cohen, K. Li and S. Shenker. "Search and Replication in Unstructured Peer-to-
Peer Networks." Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Supercomputing, 2002, 
New York, New York, USA, (2002). 
 
Mann, C. C. "The Year the Music Dies." Wired Magazine, February (2003). 
 
Maron, M. J. and R. J. Lopez. Numerical Analysis: A Practical Approach. Belmont, California, 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991. 
 
Marwell, G. and R. E. Ames. "Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, 
Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem." American Journal of Sociology 84, 6 (1979): 
1335-1360. 
 
Mathews, A. W. "Record Labels Send Messages to Warn Music File Sharers." The Wall Street 
Journal, April 30 (2003): B.6. 
 
Mathews, A. W. and N. Wingfield. "Entertainment Industry Loses File-Sharing Case -- Two 
Companies Are Cleared to Distribute Software Used to Copy Music and Movies." The Wall 
Street Journal, April 28 (2003): A.3. 
 
Medema, S. G. "Probing the Legal-Economic Nexus: Takings, 1978-1988." Journal of Economic 
Issues 26, 2 (1992): 525-535. 
 
Neale, W. C. "Institutions." Journal of Economic Issues 21, 3 (1987): 1177-1206. 
 
Nelson, C. "At Sea with Mp3's, Boomers Buoy Struggling Record Industry." The New York 
Times (online edition), November 2 (2003). 
 
Non, S. G. "Does the Peer-to-Peer Model Make Business Sense?" ZDNet UK 
(http://news.zdnet.co.uk), (2000). 11
th International Conference – Computing in Economics and Finance. Washington, DC. June 23 - 25, 2005 
 29 
 
North, D. C. "Institutions and Economic Theory." American Economist 36, 1 (1992): 3-7. 
 
Pecar, J. A. and D. A. Garbin. The New Mcgraw-Hill Telecom Factbook. New York, McGraw-
Hill, 2000. 
 
Radzicki, M. J. "Institutional Dynamics: An Extension of the Institutionalist Approach to 
Socioeconomic Analysis." Journal Economic Issues 22, 3 (1988): 633-666. 
 
Radzicki, M. J. "Institutional Dynamics, Deterministic Chaos, and Self-Organizing Systems." 
Journal of Economic Issues 24, 1 (1990a): 57-102. 
 
Radzicki, M. J. "Methodologia Oeconomiae Et Systematis Dynamis." System Dynamics Review 
6, 2 (1990b): 1213-147. 
 
Radzicki, M. J. and D. Seville. "An Institutional Dynamics Model of Sterling, Massachusetts: 
Indicative Planning at the Local Level." Journal of Economic Issues 27, 2 (1993): 481-492. 
 
Recording Industry Association of America. "Music Industry Unveils New Business Strategies 
and Combats Piracy During 2002." Available at http://www.riaa.com/PR_Story.cfm?id=618, 
(2003). 
 
Rincon, P. "Battle of File-Sharing Services Heats Up." CNN.com, March 6 (2002). 
 
Ripeanu, M., I. Foster and A. Iamnitchi. "Mapping the Gnutella Network." IEEE Internet 
Computing 6, 1 (2002): 50-57. 
 
Ritter, J. "Why Gnutella Can't Scale. No, Really." 
http://www.darkridge.com/~jpr5/doc/gnutella.html, (2001). 
 
Roberts, J. L. "Defying All Labels." Newsweek 142, 10 (2003): 38. 
 
Russell, J. "RIAA, MPAA Threaten Software Cluster Bombs." The Inquirer (available at 
http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=9306 ), May 5 (2003). 
 
Saeed, K. "Testing Design of a Social Innovation -- the Environmental Mitigation Banking 
System." Journal of Economic Issues, Forthcoming (2003). 
 
Samuels, W. J. "The Legal-Economic Nexus." George Washington Law Review 57, August 
(1989): 1556-1578. 
 
Saroiu, S., P. K. Gummadi and S. D. Gribble. "A Measurement Study of Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing Systems." University of Washington Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
Technical Report UW-CSE-01-06-02, (July 2001). 
 
Semple, K. "Record Industry Sues Hundreds of Internet Music Swappers." The New York Times, 
September 8 (2003). 
 
Sterman, J. D. Business Dynamics. Boston, MA, McGraw-Hill, 2000. 
 11
th International Conference – Computing in Economics and Finance. Washington, DC. June 23 - 25, 2005 
 30 
The Associated Press. "Illegal Music Downloading Climbs." The New York Times online 
(NYTimes.com), January 15 (2004). 
 
The Economist. "How to Pay the Piper; Online Music." May 3 (2003): 62-63. 
 
The Wall Street Journal. "Federal Appeals Court Affirms Earlier Ruling That Reined in Napster." 
June 26 (2001): B.6. 
 
Warren, K. Competitive Strategy Dynamics. New York, NY, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002. 
 
Warren, K. Strategy Dynamics Masterclass. International System Dynamics Conference, New 
York City, NY, July 2003, 2003. 
 
Wilber, C. K. and R. S. Harrison. "The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: Pattern 
Model, Storytelling, and Holism." Journal of Economic Issues 12, March (1978): 61-89. 
 
Woody, T. "The Race to Kill Kazaa." Wired Magazine, February (2003). 
 
Yang, B. and H. Garcia-Molina. "Efficient Search in Peer-to-Peer Networks." mimeo, (2002). 
 
Yen, A. C. "A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright 
Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining." University of Dayton Law Review 26, 
Winter (2001): 248-277. 
 
Yu, P. K. "The Escalating Copyright Wars." A lecture in the Frontiers in Information and 
Communications Policy 2003 Lectures Series sponsored by the James H. and Mary B. Quello 
Center for Telecommunicatoin Management and Law at Michigan State Uniersity, available at 
http://www.peteryu.com/ (2003). 
 